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§1 Introduction 
The topic of weakness of will (WOW) has attracted a significant 
amount of philosophical analysis within the last decade or so. 1 But a 
standard approach is still to analyze WOW as basically some kind of 
action contrary to one's better judgment (ACBJ, for short). I shall argue that 
WOW need not involve, and often is not, ACBJ, and thus should not be 
defined as such conduct. My argument is twofold. First, in §2,1 will argue 
for WOW without conduct (i.e., merely dispositional WOW). Second, in 
§3, I will argue against the normative standards in Robert Audi's 
conception of WOW, and for an amoral conception of WOW. Further, I 
shall argue that WOW is a particular kind of disposition to fail to act in 
accord with one's highest order desire (e.g., one's second order desires about 
first order desires such as hunger and thirst). Our topic, after all, is 
weakness of wilt. So I want to avoid assuming, as ACBJ does, that WOW 
fundamentally concerns judgment, which is identified with the intellect as 
distinct from the will. I want to avoid assuming the conflation of conativc 
states (which involve desires, dispositions and the will) with cognitive 
states (which concern beliefs, judgments, and the intellect). 
§2 Dispositional WOW 
In this section I shall argue for merely dispositional WOW. If WOW 
can be merely dispositional, WOW need not involve action, and so a 
fortiori WOW need not involve action contrary to one's better judgment 
(ACBJ, for short). ACBJ is the definition of WOW which many (e.g., 
Donald Davidson) defend, and which Audi and 1 attack (though Audi uses 
ACBJ as a part of his definition of WOW). 
ACBJ is misleading from the start. ACBJ is a misnomer for WOW, 
since "better judgment" suggests there must be two judgments, one better than 
the other. But WOW docs not require more than one judgment (even 
i For a good survey of this work, sec, Arthur F. Walker, T h e Problem of 
Weakness of Will," Nous, 23 (1989), pp. 653-76, which has a bibliography 
of 56 recent works concerning WOW. My paper here concerns incontinent 
action (i.e., action manifesting WOW). For work on a doxastic analogue of 
incontinent action, sec Alfred R. Melc, "Incontinent Believing," 
Philosophical Quarterly, 36 (1986), pp. 212-22. 
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counting all prior judgments about whatever option is in question). Audi 
recognizes this when he says: 
Whether one's will is weak at a given time should be 
determined in relation to the practical judgments one 
holds at the lime. It docs not depend on which of one's 
judgments about a given option is better, nor does it ever 
depend simply on what decisions one has made (and not 
abandoned) prior to the time in question.2 
Audi's quoted view follows his general strategy of developing a conception 
of WOW that preserves the distinction between "vacillation of intellect" 
and WOW.3 I agree with Audi that WOW essentially involves something 
other than merely changing one's beliefs. All I have read who advocate 
ACBJ agree with Audi here. So we should beware of interpreting ACBJ as 
classifying the following case as one of WOW. Al wholeheartedly acts in 
accordance with his present evaluative judgment about his options. But Al 
changed his judgment prior to his act and his prior judgment was better 
than * is later judgment with which his acts accorded. ACBJ docs not say 
Al's at was WOW, regardless of how his previous judgment was better 
(e.g., better accuracy, better information, better deliberation, better 
morally, or better prudentially). 
The other distinctions Audi wants his conception of WOW to preserve 
arc the distinctions between: 1) WOW and irresolution (he says 
irresolution does not imply WOW); 2) acting contrary to one's better 
judgment and acting inconsistently with one's better judgment (only the 
former requires awareness of one's judgment when acting); 3) WOW and 
imprudence; and 4) WOW and compulsion (or coerced action), since he says 
an unfrcc will cannot be weak.4 1 cannot discuss all these distinctions here, 
but it may help interpretation of our views to note them and note that I 
fully agree with only 2). In §31 discuss 4). Finally, note that ACBJ means 
WOW is action contrary to one's present judgment, of which one is aware, as 
to what option is better than all other options. 
AuHi and I reject ACBJ and advocate a merely dispositional conception 
of WOW. Audi argues: 
2 Robert Audi, "Weakness of Will and Practical Judgment," Nous, 13 (1979), 
p. 178. See also, Audi's "Intending, Intentional Action, and Desire," in Joel 
Marks, cd.. The Ways of Desire (Precedent, 1986), 17-38, though §4 seems 
too kind to intcrnalism, which I discuss later concerning the wholehearted 
pursuit of evil, and "Acting For Reasons," Philosophical Review, 95 (1986), 
pp. 511-46. All references to Audi below arc to his essay in Nous. 
3 Audi, p. 178. 
«Ibid., pp. 176f. 
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Suppose S judges that he should not take a drink and 
quite consciously tried to resist doing so. He may still 
form the intention to take one. May he not have thereby 
exhibited weakness of will? Even if he is not able to take 
one because the bottle is empty, he has already failed in 
the kind of inner struggle that often precedes incontinent 
action (i.e., action manifesting WOW|. Similarly, if S 
makes the judgment at l that it would be better to do A 
than anything incompatible with doing it, then provided . 
he believes he can do it, his failure to form, at 
(approximately) t, an intention to do A, would manifest 
weakness of wi l l . . . the same kind of failure of will.5 
I advocate Audi's description here of WOW as failure of will, an 
inefficacy of will. The failure can be manifested in inaction and hence 
/ICBJ is inaccurate. One may object that S's forming the intention to take 
the drink is an act, and so Audi's example comports with ACBJ. I grant 
that there arc mental acts (e.g., mathematical calculations) and that one 
can form an intention through the mental act of deliberation. But reducing 
ACBJ to such acts is still a major refinement of WOW which Audi 
achieves, having shown that WOW need not involve overt acts. Moreover, 
Audi's example of manifesting WOW by fading to form an intention shows 
that inaction can manifest WOW. And one cannot rebut the point by saying 
that the soollcd inaction was really the action of refraining or deciding 
not to act overtly. For the inaction was, by hypothesis, due to not forming 
an intention rather than forming an intention to refrain from acting. And 
the failure did not involve deciding to refrain because, by hypothesis, S 
makes the judgment (i.e., decision) that it would be better to do A (which is 
the act S failed to form the intention to do). 
And I would take Audi's analysis further. One might not completely 
fail to form the intention to do A; one may form it but only after too much of 
a delay or too much of what Audi calls an inner struggle. 'Too much of a 
struggle" means that even though the result of the struggle conforms to S's 
better judgment, the struggle was more agonizing, involved stronger desires 
(on the losing side of the conflict) than those that would have been 
involved had there been no WOW (i.e., than if one had followed one's 
highest order desire, as wc shall sec). This is what Audi means by the 
kind of inner struggle that normally precedes incontinent action. The 
struggle (which manifests WOW) can occur even though incontinent action 
does not. In other words, in WOW the struggle is not always won by the 
desires conflicting with one's better judgment (or higher order desire, as wc 
shall sec). 
5 Ibid., p. 181. (emphasis added, except for 'failure'.) 
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Audi's view, which I endorse on these points, docs not say that acting 
without WOW requires wholehearted action. Only a certain kind of 
motivational struggle constitutes WOW. Not just any struggle constitutes 
WOW. He says: 
II |t is not reasonable to regard as incontinent just any want 
of S's that is at odds with his practical judgment. S's 
want to do A may be too weak to be at all likely to bring 
him to do or even intend to do it; hence, even if doing A is 
against S's practical judgment, his wanting to do it does 
not imply that his will has failed in its function (which 
is making one's second order desires effective (i.e., cause 
action aimed at fulfilling the second-order desire)). Dut 
what if the want, though not predominant, is "strong" . . . 
Wc do not and should not assume that one ought not to 
want even strongly,things whose realization is against 
one's practical judgment. For . . . wc regard it as quite 
natural to want, even strongly, things which wc judge wc 
ought not to have, e.g., sweets.6 
So Audi docs not require wholeheartedncss to avoid WOW. The strong-
willed person can still be tempted to cat sweets. And at least in more 
serious matters one can even face an agonizing choice. Given some sets of 
desires, some choices just are agonizing. WOW occurs only when some 
desires have more strength or influence over you than they would if you 
were prudent.7 For the desires competing against them arc weaker than 
they would be if one fulfilled one's second-order desire (i.e., one's desire 
*lbid., p. 183. As wc will sec, my view leads mc to say "that the strong-
willed person docs not want" instead of "one ought not to want." 
7 Quantifying the motivational strength of desires may initially seem 
somewhat problematic, but commonsense clearly accepts ordinal rankings of 
preferences. Indeed, the concept of preferring one thing to another implies 
an ordinal ranking. So wc need not try to develop a cardinal ranking of 
preferences to continue to use the metaphorical concept of motivational 
strength (which is a quantifiable concept). One may object that 
motivational strength is so metaphorical that it is not an empirically 
testable concept, especially considering the lack of cardinal rankings of 
preferences. And since psychology is an empirical science, one might 
conclude that motivational strength is psychologically unhelpful, 
explaining little or nothing about the psychological phenomenon of WOW. 
But Santas, citing two psychological studies, shows how motivational 
strength has empirically testable significance. Sec Ccrasimos Xcnophon 
Santas, Socrates: Philosophy in Plato's Early Dialogues (New York: RKP, 
1979), pp. 213-14. 
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about how strong one's first-order desires, e.g., hunger and thirst, arc). This 
weakness is WOW. 
In the immediately foregoing quotation Audi introduces the ideas of 
what we "ought not to want" and what is "natural to want" and what is 
"reasonable to regard as" a failure.8 These arc normative concepts I wish to 
avoid using; for I advocate a non-moral conception of WOW. I shall present 
and criticize Audi's overly normative conception of WOW in the next 
section. The foregoing arguments show how WOW is often merely 
dispositional, and so show the error of defining WOW as action contrary to 
one's better judgment. 
Consider a final example. Suppose Al is a guard with a weakness for 
women in that Al could not bring himself knowingly to shoot an attacking 
woman, even if he had a second-order desire to shoot her, and believed 
doing so would be prudent and morally required. Fortunately, no woman 
ever attacks Al. So his WOW never manifests itself in any struggle, or any 
action or inaction. Still, Al is weak-willed, since he is disposed to act 
incontinently under certain circumstances. This advances Audi's analysis a 
step further, showing that the disposition that is WOW need not even 
involve a struggle. 
§3 Against Audi's Normative Standards for WOW 
In this section wc reach deeper and more important issues. I now argue 
against the normative standards in Audi's conception of WOW, and for an 
amoral conception of WOW. Audi holds a conception of WOW which has 
moral or normative implications. Audi makes a moral-or at least a 
normative-argument for his view that WOW never involves succumbing to 
an irresistible impulse. He says: 
Weakness of will is surely a normative phenomenon in at 
least this sense: if S docs A incontinently (i.e., due to 
WOW| then S is in some way criticizablc for doing A . . . 
whether morally, prudcntially, or in some other way(s). 
. . Now suppose wc add the widely believed premise 
that if S docs A under compulsion, he is not criticizable 
for doing it. It would follow that incontinent actions are 
q 
never compelled. 
»Audi,p.183. 
9 Ibid., p. 179. Audi actually rejects this formulation of the argument. He 
rejects the second premise formulated as "if S docs A under compulsion, S is 
not criticizable for doing A." But Audi has reservations about this 
argument only because ho advances a group of counterexamples which he 
admits includes no cases of WOW. Thus, wc can easily save the second 
premise from Audi's reservation, which is irrelevant to WOW, by 
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I am willing to grant the widely believed premise, which seems to be a 
special case of ""ought* implies 'can'", though the premise has increasingly 
come under attack in recent years, especially concerning the insanity 
defense. An irresistible impulse (or compulsion) cannot be resisted, and so, 
based on "'ought' implies 'can'", I am willing to grant here than one cannot 
correctly criticize someone for failing to resist such an impulse. Still, I 
think that it is a least sometimes a motivational failure, and hence that it 
can correctly be called a weakness of one's will. But, instead of adopting 
Audi'.*; view, wc can simply conclude that WOW is not always correctly 
criticizablc. This seems a much simpler and better solution. And since not 
all cases of WOW involve compulsion, the simpler solution preserves 
Audi's distinction between compelled action and WOW, which is the 
rationale for his argument.10 
On whether WOW is always criticizablc, and whether WOW is a 
moral concept, I side with Davidson, who sees WOW as a metaphysical 
concept in the theory of action, independent of ethics.1 1 WOW is more 
useful as a metaphysical concept free of moral baggage and entanglements. 
For psychologists could then use the concept of WOW without venturing 
into an area where they may consider them somewhat less qualified, moral 
philosophy. And an amoral conception of WOW will help moral theory 
and action theory, since we could then use the concept of WOW without 
begging moral questions. I shall defend a somewhat normative, but amoral, 
conception of WOW. Since the norm I use is prudence, and since I deny that 
all WOW is (even prudentially) criticizablc, psychologists and 
psychiatrists can use the concept of WOW with less danger of imposing 
values upon a client that are not the client's own. 
Further, Thalberg gives an initially plausible argument against a 
moral conception of WOW, saying: 
'He shouldn't have done Y * . . . cannot always |bc said| of 
a person who had better Isubjcctivel reasons to do X 
instead. Otherwise you would be endorsing the dubious 
reformulating the second premise as "if S docs A under compulsion and if A 
is a case of WOW, then S is not criticizablc for doing A." Audi admits that 
the originally formulated argument is valid. My revision of the second 
premise docs not change that. My revision merely makes clearer what the 
original context was-cascs of WOW. And Audi accepts the first premise 
(i.e., "if S docs A incontinently then S is in some way criticizablc for doing 
A") and the conclusion (i.e., "incontinent actions arc never compelled") of 
the argument. On all this, sec, Ibid., pp. 179-80. 
»° Ibid., p. 180. 
1 1 Donald Davidson, "How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?" in Essays On 
Actions & Events, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
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principle that everyone including Nero, Genghis Khan, 
Torqucmada and Hitler, ought to do what he judges 
b e s t . . . The point is that wc often hold that some action, 
which another person believes he ought to perform is 
wrong or inadvisable in some way. If he fails to perform, 
then we would be inconsistent if wc maintained our 
disapproval of the action he was contemplating, but 
condemned him for failing to carry it out. Only when we 
share the agent's belief that he ought to do X is it 
logically possible for us (consistently and correctly 1 to 
decry his failure (as suchj. 1 2 
But I must disagree with Thalberg. For we can consistently and correctly 
condemn Jim Bakkcr or Jimmy Swaggart for their hypocrisy even if we 
scarcely share their beliefs about what they ought to do. Specifically, a 
libertarian or liberal might claim that Bakkcr and Swaggart are wrong to 
condemn prostitution among consenting adults, but that if they are going to 
condemn prostitution anyway, at least they should not pay prostitutes for 
sex. One can correctly decry their paying for sex even if one thinks 
prostitution per sc is morally permissible. 
But wc need an amoral conception of WOW, for in at least some cases of 
WOW we should even praise the would-be Hitler for his WOW. Here is 
the first of the two main examples in this paper that I wish my reader to 
focus on. Suppose young Hans is indoctrinated by Nazis and is months later 
ordered to kill a group of Jews. Hans believes he ought to kill them, but his 
humanity "gets the better of him." He has lingering, unarticulatcd 
feelings about what he ought to do. Still, he believes he ought to kill 
them, and that it is highly probable that his Nazi teachers and superiors 
have been right all along. Hans is not a squeamish person. And he has a 
second-order desire to kill them according to his orders. But come time to 
pull the trigger, his humanity and sympathetic feelings for the Jews lead 
Hans to let them escape, even though he has not changed his mind, and is 
acutely aware of his motivational failing. Further, suppose Hans is 
prudent to let them escape because Hans has been trusted to kill them, by 
himself, in an area bordering enemy lines (and far from other Nazis or 
Nazi-sympathizers) and to dispose of their bodies completely. We can 
suppose that firing his gun so close to enemy lines (or taking time to dispose 
of the bodies completely) is imprudent. I sec no sound, normative criticism 
of Hans' act of letting the Jews escape. 
The counterargument that wc can always criticize someone for acting 
against his better judgment just because it is against his better judgment 
(i.e., just on grounds of internal inconsistency) trivializes the thesis. First, 
1 2 Irving Thalberg. "Acting Against One's Better Judgment," in Weakness of 
Will, ed., Ceollrey Mortimer (New York: KKP, 1979), p. 244. 
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the counterargument begs the question against arguments that sympathy 
should sometimes take priority over conscience.'3 Second, I argued above 
that WOW need not involve inconsistency between superior and inferior 
judgments. Third, foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds; not 
all internal inconsistencies arc normatively critici/able, but some are—as 
the cases of Dakkcr and Swaggart show. Simply saying that all internal 
inconsistencies arc criticizablc as such trivializes the thesis, and begs the 
question by failing to give any further or independent rationale for the 
criticism. Moreover, this objection would require fanaticism (Nazi 
massacre) to avoid criticizablc WOW, which is absurd. Hans should have 
conflicting feelings, given his circumstances. Further, even if there is an 
undiscovered, normative criticism of Hans, wc can tell Hans' case is one of 
WOW even before discovering any criticism. So it is highly misleading 
and unnecessary to go out on a limb and say WOW must be normatively 
criticizablc and include that as one of the very defining characteristics of 
WOW. 
One may object that I owe an explanation for how the WOW of Hans is 
not criticizablc even though the WOW of Dakkcr and Swaggart is 
criticizablc The distinction between the cases is that Hans is young and 
(understandably) confused whereas Dakkcr and Swaggart arc older (old 
enough to know better) and hypocritical. 
Perhaps all Audi means by saying WOW is always criticizablc is that 
WOW always involves a case where the agent is morally responsible and 
could have refrained from doing the incontinent act. That is, WOW is 
always criticizablc because were the incontinent act wrong, the actor could 
be correctly criticized for doing the act, since the stricture '"ought' implies 
'can'" is met in all case of WOW. I consider this to be too watered down to 
be Audi's view. Dut if it is his view, then I differ only on case of compulsion 
(e.g., irresistible impulses). Audi's argument for distinguishing compulsion 
from WOW is that WOW is essentially a normative concept. 
There is another reason, besides Hans' case, to avoid Audi's normative 
analysis of WOW. Audi classifies the (voluntary) knowing pursuit of evil 
as WOW, saying: "S exhibits |WOW|... if . . . S forms the intention or a 
predominant want to do A, where doing A is against his better judgment 
. . ." 1 4 The knowing pursuit of evil is, I grant, acting against one's better 
judgment. Dut here is the second of the two main examples 1 wish my 
reader to focus on. Surely an evil person, call him Cecil the devil 
worshipper, can even do research on what the morally right thing to do 
would be, and then, based on this research, deliberately and painstakingly 
do what is evil. Cecil can be moved by prudential considerations (e.g., he 
can safely steal undetected) and his desire to act on evil desires and do evil 
1 3 Sec, e.g., 'The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn," Philosophy,49 (1974), 
pp. 123-134. 
»< Audi, pp.180f. 
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(as such). Moreover, suppose knowingly doing evil fulfills Cecil's second-
order desire to do evil as such. Audi would say Cecil exhibits WOW 
because, by hypothesis, Cecil's moral judgment is that Cecil ought not do 
the evil. Because Cecil acts wholeheartedly, without motivational 
conflict and in accordance with his second-order desire to do things based on 
evil desires, I claim he docs not act incontinently. I grant that Cecil acts 
against his better judgment, but I claim this is irrelevant given that he acts 
in accord with his second-order desire (i.e., his desire about his other 
desires). 
One may object that Cecil must have some sort of overall judgment that 
it is really best to do what is evil, since to worship the devil is to believe 
that the devil's way (evil) is best. Thus, one may object, Cecil's case fails 
to fit ACBJ, and thus cannot be a counterexample to ACBJ. But this objection 
conflates conativc and cognitive states. Cecil, as a purely intellectual 
matter, identifies the evil and the good acts to do. Cecil can even 
intellectually accept a Kantian view that obeying morality is what is 
more important overall. Yet Cecil can have absolutely no desire to obey 
morality. He can have a desire to do evil, as such, instead. If Cecil's case 
is too strange to sec this clearly at first, compare the following more 
mundane case. Pat acknowledges the soundness of arguments concluding 
that he should give at least something to charity to relieve hunger. But 
Pat is unmoved, having no desire to do so. Pat asks "What's in it for me?" 
Pat is apathetic toward morality. Similarly, Cecil is unmoved to obey 
morality. He can say "What's in it for me? I desire to do evil as such, and 
prudence docs not go against the sort of evil I have in mind." But in the 
cases of Pat and Cecil where is the motivational weakness required for 
WOW? They act exactly as they want, and they act wholeheartedly 
without any motivational conflict. So I conclude that there is no WOW in 
their cases. 
Those who object to my view here have the burden of showing the 
motivational weakness in Cecil's wholehearted actions. One may object 
that the motivational weakness is simply the absence of motivation to do 
the right thing. But this simple view would prove too much. Since nobody 
is perfect, wc would all be weak of will virtually all the time. I cannot 
defend a particular morality here. But morality seems demanding enough 
to make this objection classify too many of us as weak of will too much of 
the time. Further, the objection fails to see how WOW involves a conflict 
within the agent's psychology. Recall Audi's view about WOW as an inner 
struggle. A case of wholehearted yet incontinent action seems incoherent. 
One m.iy object that I am taking "better judgment" to mean "judgment as 
to what is morally best" and that this is not the way it would be taken by 
anyone inclined to accept the definition of WOW as acting against one's 
better judgment. The objection clearly fails, for I do not so take "better 
judgment." I mean it just as Audi, Davidson, and Thalbcrg mean it, namely 
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as a judgment as to what one ought to do, all things considered.^ The point 
in Cecil's case is that this judgment about what is best, all things 
considered, is a purely intellectual judgment that the moral act is best, and 
that the judgment involves no motivation to do the moral act. 
But the ambiguity in the use of "better judgment" by Audi docs create 
some important ground where my view and Audi's might be reconciled. 
Audi might mean by "better judgment" one's decision, all things considered, 
about what one will do. The judgment here is the occurrcnt, present decision 
to start willing the act in question (i.e., to issue the relevant volition). It is 
not a mere prediction about what one is about to do. I agree that if one 
acted contrary to one's better judgment (in this sense), then one could act 
incontinently. And to the degree that one was disposed to act contrary to 
such decisions one would have WOW. One can have conflicting second-
order desires A only, and desire to have a set of desires B only, yet know 
that the two sets are incompatible because the sets contain different 
elements (desires). But in such cases the decision one acts against must be 
present at the time of action, since 1 agree with Audi that WOW is distinct 
from mere intellectual vacillation. If one failed to form the intent to do the 
act decided upon, one has WOW. Such a failure would occur if one formed 
instead an intent to do another act (or no act). All decisions, in the sense 
used here, are accompanied by first-order and second-order desires to do the 
act decided upon (or, in the case of conflicting second-order desires, a third-
order desire—i.e., a desire about one's second-order desires, particularly a 
desire about how the conflict between the second-order desires will be 
resolved). For one is deciding which of one's first and second-order desires 
to fulfill. Harry Frankfurt details the role second-order desires play in 
self-reflection, self-evaluation, and in the issuance of volitions.16 And I at 
least roughly follow Frankfurt here. 
Consider another case. Audi might mean that in some cases the better 
judgment is one's judgment about what act all prudential factors favor. One 
could be not incontinent yet act against such a judgment based on a first-
order desire (e.g., an imprudent impulse) or even based on a second-order 
desire than on lack certain first-order desires. Since prudence is calculated 
by considering all desires of the agent, event he first-order desires that one 
has a second-order desire to end, one's second-order desire can conflict with 
one's prudential judgment. (For simplification, 1 assume they conflict in a 
case where the agent knows that moral considerations and other non-
prudential considerations favor neither option considered by the agent). 
Such a conflicting second-order desire can be, for example, the desire to do 
an act that will thereby make one a different sort of person than one is. But 
given that one is not that sort of person, prudence dictates refraining from 
15 Ibid., p. 177, Davidson, p. 21, and Thalberg, p. 234. 
1 6 Sec Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a 
Person," Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1971), especially §11. 
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doing an act. A, to fulfill the second-order desire, and to do instead another 
act, U, which prudently satisfies the vast bulk of one's desires, but which 
fails to satisfy one's second-order desire. If one had a conflicting second-
order desire to do D, then I think knowingly doing A instead would be 
incontinent. But if the second-order desire to do A were one's only second-
order desire (and there were no even higher order desires), then I suspect 
that knowingly doing A would hardly be incontinent. For, on the contrary, 
the case seems to involve strength of will, where one becomes what one 
really wants to be (and has a second-order desire to be) through sheer force 
of will, even though becoming such a person is imprudent. The very fact 
that one overcame all the other desires that made doing B prudent snows 
how strong one's will was. So such cases fit what I conclude must be the best 
definition of WOW, namely, that WOW is the disposition to fail to act in 
accord with one's highest order desire. As Robert Roberts argues: 
Why do wc tend to think a moral achievement greater if 
more difficult? . . . |M|orally difficult actions display... -
the virtues of will power. B u t . . . a deeper basis for our 
feeling here is that the greater the moral obstacles (that 
is, contrary inclinations) a person has overcome in doing 
something, the more his action seems to be his own 
achievement, his own choice, and thus to reflect credit on 
him as an agent. It seems to show his action is his in a 
special way. 1 7 
The agent should get metaphysical credit for the strength of this effort. 
§4 Conclusion 
I conclude that not all WOW is criticizable, since Hans' case is a 
counterexample to Audi's view. And using Cecil as a counterexample 1 
argued against Audi's classification of the knowing pursuit of evil as 
WOW. Those who object to my view have the burden of showing 1) what is 
immoral in Hans' action of letting the jews escape, and 2) what is 
motivationally weak in Cecil's wholehearted actions. My main conclusion 
is that WOW is having a disposition (to fail to act in accord with one's 
highest order desire) that is greater than such a disposition would be (at 
least typically) if one were completely prudent. One may object that my 
view leaves no rational, motivational role for morality. But prudence is at 
least normative, and thus my conception of WOW, although amoral, is 
»7 Robert C. Roberts, "Will Power And The Virtues," in Robert C. Roberts 
and Robert B. Kruschwitz, cds., The Virtues: Contemporary Essays On 
Moral Character (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1987), p. 125 (emphasis in 
original). 
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normative and hence partially reconciled with Audi's view. Moreover, as 1 
said earlier, I mean prudence in the sense of maximizing the satisfaction of 
all of one's desires, including one's desires about doing the moral thing as 
such. So I leave room for a rational, motivational role for morality, since I 
preserve the distinction between prudence and egoism (by including in 
prudence any desires to do the morally right thing as such). Dut while my 
conception of WOW is somewhat normative, it is still an amoral conception 
of WOW, because 1 showed how morality is irrelevant to the definition of 
WOW. My conception of WOW is only somewhat normative, since I 
conclude, based on my example of Hans, that nothing criticizablc or 
imprudent is a necessary condition of WOW. Dut I conclude that following 
the norm of prudence, except in the case at the end of §3, which involves 
wiling to become a new sort of person, is a sufficient condition for strength of 
will ." 
1 8 I wish to thank the following for their comments: Carl Ginet, Cordon 
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